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1FOREWORD: AFTER GUANTÁNAMO
Michael P. Scharf* & Sonia Vohra†
I. INTRODUCTION
“Guantánamo Bay.” To many around the world those two words 
conjure up haunting images of orange jumpsuit-clad detainees imprisoned 
behind barbed-wire fences, subjected to the cruelest imaginable interroga-
tion techniques, and held indefinitely without trial, or awaiting trial before 
military commissions whose procedures violate international law. It is no 
surprise, then, that the new U.S. administration perceived the Guantánamo
Bay detention center and associated detainee policies as an indelible stain 
on America’s moral authority and an impediment to the success of future 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Thus, on the first Monday of his presidency, January 22, 2009, 
President Barak Obama signed Executive Orders requiring the closure of 
the Guantánamo Bay facility within twelve months,1 the dismantling of the 
CIA’s network of secret prisons around the globe, and the prohibition on the 
CIA’s use of coercive interrogation methods that deviate from the require-
ments of the Army Field Manual.2
In his first speech to the U.N. on September 23, 2009, President 
Obama observed, “I took office at a time when many around the world had 
come to view America with skepticism and distrust.” To sustained applause 
he said,
The Executive Order on Interrogations 
specifically prohibits U.S. government personnel or agents from relying on 
the Bush Administration Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda in interpret-
ing Federal criminal laws, the Convention Against Torture, or the require-
ments of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
On my first day in office, I prohibited—without exception or equivoca-
tion—the use of torture by the United States of America. I ordered the 
prison at Guantanamo Bay closed, and we are doing the hard work of forg-
* Michael Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko—Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law and 
Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity School of Law.
† Articles Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, B.A., Northwestern 
University (2006); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (expected May 
2010).
1 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
2 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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ing a framework to combat extremism within the rule of law. Every nation 
must know: America will live its values . . . together to demonstrate that 
international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be en-
forced.3
A month later, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced their 
selection of President Obama for the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, stressing Ob-
ama’s commitment to international law and diplomacy: “For 108 years, the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee has sought to stimulate precisely that interna-
tional policy and those attitudes for which Obama is now the world’s lead-
ing spokesman.”4
Even President Obama acknowledged that the Nobel Peace Prize 
spoke more about what he pledged to do than what he had accomplished to 
date. To implement the President’s new policies concerning Guantánamo,
administration officials face daunting questions about what to do with the 
detainees as well as the former officials behind the torture policies and me-
mos. In an effort to bring expert insights to these questions, on September 
11, 2009 (the eighth anniversary of 9/11), the Frederick K. Cox Internation-
al Law Center and its co-sponsors,5 with the support of a generous grant 
from the Wolf Family Foundation, convened two dozen of the world’s lead-
ing academics, practitioners, former government officials, and NGO repre-
sentatives with specialized knowledge and experience in this area to partici-
pate in a day-long symposium at Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law. The assembled experts focused on such questions as: Who must be 
released from U.S. detention? Where should they be sent? Where should the 
remaining detainees be held? What procedures should govern their contin-
ued detention? Which of the remaining detainees should face trial? What 
venue and form of trial should be used? And should the architects of the 
U.S. torture policies and memos face justice?6
3 Obama’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/politics/24prexy.text.html?_r=1&
pagewanted=all.
4 Announcement, The Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009, 
Oct. 9, 2009, http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/home/announce-2009/ (last visited Nov. 22, 
2009).
5 The Conference was co-sponsored by the American Society of International Law, the 
American Branch of the International Law Association, the American National Section of the 
International Association of Penal Law, the American Bar Association’s International Legal 
Education Committee, the Case Western Reserve Institute for Global Security Law and Poli-
cy, the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, the International Criminal 
Law Network, the Maltz Museum of Jewish Heritage, and the Public International Law and 
Policy Group. 
6 Things are moving quickly and the administration has already answered some of these 
questions. On August 24, 2009, for example, the Obama administration named a special 
prosecutor to investigate whether CIA officers or contractors violated the Bush administra-
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The symposium began with a keynote speech by Major General 
John D. Altenburg, former Convening Authority of the al-Qaeda Military 
Commissions. This was followed by four panels in roundtable “cross-fire” 
format: (1) A Retrospective on the Military Commissions; (2) Dismantling 
Guantánamo: Facing the Challenges of Continued Detention and Repatria-
tion; (3) The Appropriate Venue for Trying Terrorist Cases; and (4) Ac-
countability for the Torture Memos. The symposium was webcast live, and 
the speeches and panel discussions are available for viewing anytime at: 
http://law.case.edu/Lectures/tabid/120/Default.aspx?lec_id=201.
This special double issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law contains twenty articles generated from the “After Guan-
tánamo” symposium. We have worked extra hard to expedite the publica-
tion of this issue in order to get it into the hands of policy makers, members 
of Congress, jurists, academics and practitioners who will play an important 
role in the formation and implementation of the new policies toward the 
Guantánamo Bay detainees and those responsible for the abuses at 
Guantánamo.
II. AFTER GUANTÁNAMO: A PREVIEW OF THE ISSUE
As a scene-setter, the issue begins with an article by Major General 
John D. Altenburg, Jr., a former career Army Judge Advocate and Conven-
ing Authority for the Bush Administration’s al-Qaeda Military Commis-
sions. In Just Three Mistakes!,7 General Altenburg describes what he con-
siders to be the Bush Administration’s three major mistakes in 2001 and 
2002, explaining how these three fundamental errors created the ground-
work for the misunderstanding of international humanitarian law and mili-
tary authority and how discussion of these mistakes can help inform the 
Obama Administration on its critical decisions and policies regarding com-
bat operations, detention policy, detention location, and war crime trial ve-
nues. Next, in The Consequences of Unlawful Preemption and the Legal 
Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Its Victims,8
tion’s interrogation policies. Critics have pointed out, however, that the investigation is de-
signed to focus on a few low level interrogators, rather than the architects of policies that 
contravened both international and U.S. law. See Margaret Taley, Picking Special Prosecutor 
on CIA May Cause Discord, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 25, 2009, at A3. On November 14, 2009, 
the Obama administration announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Guantá-
namo detainees would be tried in federal court in New York City for the role they played in 
the 9/11 attacks, while five others would be prosecuted in the al-Qaeda Military Commis-
sions. See Eric Lichtblau & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before 
Civilian Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.
Dr. Johannes van Agge-
7 John D. Altenburg, Jr., Just Three Mistakes!, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 11 (2009).
8 Johannes van Aggelen, The Consequences of Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty 
to Protect the Human Rights of Its Victims, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2009).
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len, a former official of the U.N. Office of High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, undertakes a wide-ranging exploration of the Bush Administration
policies and tactics in the war on terror, as well as related human rights con-
sequences, U.S. Supreme Court cases, and lower court jurisprudence. It is 
noteworthy that van Aggelen concludes from this survey of law that the 
Bush Administration’s “hegemonic interpretation” did not in fact shake the 
foundations of international law.
The second group of articles focuses on the past and future of the 
al-Qaeda Military Commissions. In Magna Carta, the Interstices of Proce-
dure, and Guantánamo,9 Vanderbilt Philosophy Professor Larry May ex-
amines the procedural rights found in the Magna Carta and explores the 
abridgment of these rights in Guantánamo. He maintains that the Magna 
Carta’s gradual impact on the development of English law is a useful model 
for the construction of an international legal agreement protecting these 
Magna Carta procedural rights, rights ultimately denied to detainees in 
Guantánamo. In Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of 
the High Value Detainees,10 Col. (ret.) Morris Davis, the former Chief Pros-
ecutor for the Military Commissions at Guantánamo Bay, details from his 
personal perspective the challenge of constructing a credible criminal case 
against high-value detainees triggered by the torture methods which were 
employed to elicit intelligence information. Col. Davis discusses the deci-
sion to use a “clean team” of law enforcement personnel to question the 
high-value detainees recently transferred to Guantánamo Bay in order to 
gather “clean” admissions to introduce at trial. Professor Gregory McNeal 
of Penn State School of Law discusses, in his article Organizational Cul-
ture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo—Legal Policy,11 how organiza-
tional theory is helpful in understanding legal ethics and political control of 
the military and bureaucracies. As an example of organizational culture and 
its impact, he describes the Bush Administration’s attempt to control mili-
tary culture through its interrogation policy and the military’s efforts to suc-
cessfully fend off the Bush Administration’s attempts to modify the mili-
tary’s organizational culture. In Some Observations on the Future of 
U.S. Military Commissions,12
9 Larry May, Magna Carta, the Interstices of Procedure, and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 91 (2009).
Professor Michael Newton of Vanderbilt 
Law School (formerly Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War 
Crimes Issues) debunks the myth of military inadequacy and observes that 
10 Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the High 
Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115 (2009).
11 Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo—
Legal Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 125 (2009).
12 Michael A. Newton, Some Observations on the Future of U.S. Military Commissions,
42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 151 (2009).
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military commissions have achieved the goal of military justice and remain 
a legally valid tool for the Commander-in-Chief. He acknowledges the dif-
ficult legal and policy dilemmas the Obama Administration will face in re-
considering the current statutory structure of military commissions and pro-
vides his insight on refining the existing commissions system. Captain
Keith Petty, a Case Western Reserve University School of Law graduate 
and current prosecutor at the Office of Military Commissions, rebuts criti-
cism that the reconstituted military commissions fail to adhere to the Gene-
va Conventions laws of armed conflict in his article, Are You There, Gene-
va? It’s Me, Guantánamo.13
The third group of articles addresses the challenges of continued de-
tention and repatriation in the wake of the dismantling of Guantánamo. De-
von Chaffee, Advocacy Counsel of Human Rights First, in her article The 
Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued “Prolonged” Deten-
tion is No Solution to Guantánamo,
Captain Petty points to the case of United 
States v. Hamdan as an example of the military commissions’ application of 
the Geneva Conventions through the laws of war, codified in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006. 
14 disapproves of President Obama’s 
decision to indefinitely detain some prisoners without trial after the closing 
of the Guantánamo detention facility. She argues that this decision will jeo-
pardize national security and foreign policy objectives, impede the U.S.’
ability to advance democracy and counterterrorism, and that it sidesteps 
difficult issues indefinitely. Former ICRC Legal Advisor Laura Olson, in 
her article Guantánamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court’s De-
cisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards?,15 discusses how courts 
in habeas proceedings of detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility 
have delineated the boundaries on the U.S. government’s detention authori-
ty. Olson analyzes whether the courts’ decisions are consistent with the in-
ternational humanitarian law (IHL) internment standards and examines the 
Bush and Obama Administrations’ definition of “enemy combatant” as 
compared to the IHL standards. In Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Stan-
dards of Proof: Viewing the Law Through Multiple Lenses,16
13 Keith A. Petty, Are You There, Geneva? It’s Me, Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 171 (2009).
Columbia Law 
School Professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee 
Affairs Matthew Waxman explores questions of competing risks and their 
distribution evoked by the Boumediene v. Bush judicial standard of “proof 
14 Devon Chaffee, The Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued “Prolonged” 
Detention is No Solution to Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 187 (2009).
15 Laura M. Olson, Guantánamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court’s Decisions 
Consistent with IHL Internment Standards?, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 197 (2009).
16 Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing 
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245 (2009).
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and related evidentiary principles,” the standard which the habeas court 
imposed on the government to justify continued detention. Professor Wax-
man maintains that although answering these policy questions will vary 
depending on through which lens one views the problem, the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches should play a part in answering these ques-
tions, as the answers are critical to establishing a sound detention policy.
The fourth group of articles discusses the appropriate venue for 
prosecuting terrorist cases. In his article, In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting 
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts 2009 Update and Recent Develop-
ments,17 James J. Benjamin, Jr., co-author of a series of influential Human 
Rights First reports on this topic, addresses the question of where and under
what set of rules the government’s prosecution of accused terrorists should 
occur. Benjamin argues that the federal criminal justice system is well 
equipped to handle prosecuting terrorism cases, and there is no need for a 
national security court. To prove these propositions, he provides, in detail, 
the findings of his co-authored Report, In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, and his co-authored supplement to 
In Pursuit of Justice, entitled 2009 Update and Recent Developments, which 
are grounded in actual data and experience. In Not “By All Means Neces-
sary”: A Comparative Framework for Post-9/11 Approaches to Counterter-
rorism,18 Amos Guiora, University of Utah Law Professor and a former 
senior lawyer for the Israeli Defense Force, delves into a comparativist ap-
proach between Israel’s policies of targeted killing and administrative de-
tention and the U.S.’ counterterrorism policy. Guiora maintains that Israel’s 
two policies are relevant and adaptable to the U.S. legal framework while 
taking into account the influence of judicial, constitutional, societal, and 
geographical differences on each country’s counterterrorism policy. Next, 
Duke Law School Professor Scott L. Silliman, in his article Prosecuting 
Alleged Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent Option,19
17 James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Fed-
eral Courts 2009 Update and Recent Developments, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 267 (2009).
compares 
and contrasts prosecuting detainees in federal district courts with prosecut-
ing detainees in the recently revised military commissions. Professor Silli-
man argues that the recently revised military commissions are a prudent 
option to prosecute detainees and should be used in combination with the 
federal district courts. Finally, Professor Glenn Sulmasy and Professor And-
rea Katsenes Logman argue in their article A Hybrid Court for a Hybrid 
18 Amos N. Guiora, Not “By All Means Necessary”: A Comparative Framework for Post-
9/11 Approaches to Counterterrorism, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 273 (2009).
19 Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent 
Option, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 289 (2009).
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The fifth group of articles discusses the accountability issues arising 
out of the torture memos. Cox Center Director Michael P. Scharf, in his 
article International Law and the Torture Memos,
that the Obama Administration must update the U.S. legal regime to 
meet the threat of international terror, as the two existing paradigms—the 
law enforcement model and the military law model—are not properly 
equipped to handle this hybrid war and to strike the delicate balance of mili-
tary law, intelligence needs, human rights obligations, and the need for jus-
tice. They propose a way out of the Guantánamo fiasco by creating a Na-
tional Security Court System to hear cases of international terrorism and 
achieve this required delicate balance.
21 provides background 
about the internal decision-making process that led to the promulgation of 
the Torture Memos. Professor Scharf uses the case study of the evolution of 
the Bush Administration’s policies regarding treatment of detainees in the 
war on terror to explore the extent to which international law influences 
American foreign policy during times of crisis. In Civil Liability of Bush, 
Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and 
Forced Disappearance,22 University of Houston Law Professor Jordan 
Paust argues that the former officials involved in the Bush Administration’s 
admitted program of serial criminality are subject to civil liability for their 
violations of treaty-based and customary international law. He explores the 
duty to provide and the right to fair compensation stipulated in these bodies 
of law and contends that (1) the U.S. should not be substituted in U.S. civil 
suits for the former officials; (2) immunity does not pertain to these former 
officials due to the Military Commissions Act; and (3) that relevant interna-
tional law has dominance over the Military Commissions Act. Case Western 
Reserve University Law Professor Cassandra Robertson, in her article 
Beyond The Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, 
and Partisan Identity,23
20 Glenn M. Sulmasy & Andrea K. Logman, A Hybrid Court for a Hybrid War, 42 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 299 (2009).
addresses the difficulties the Department of Jus-
tice’s Office of Professional Responsibility will encounter in holding the 
lawyers who authored the torture memos accountable for their advice advo-
cating the permissible use of certain interrogation techniques. Professor 
Robertson argues that it will be difficult for the DOJ to prove the lawyers 
wrote the memo in bad faith, and the DOJ’s decision to hold the lawyers 
accountable will lack political legitimacy due to a redefinition of cultural 
21 Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 321 (2009).
22 Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359 (2009).
23 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural 
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389 (2009).
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commitments associated with partisan identity. Dr. Kai Ambos, a distin-
guished German Law Professor and judge, in his article Prosecuting Guan-
tánamo in Europe: Can and Shall the Masterminds of the “Torture Memos” 
Be Held Criminally Responsible on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction?,24
analyzes the jurisdictional and procedural requirements in Belgium, Germa-
ny, and Spain necessary to prosecute the masterminds of the torture memos 
in Europe, concluding that the law and practice of these European countries 
advance a cautious approach to extraterritorial prosecution of international 
crimes, resulting in the replacement of universal jurisdiction with a subsidi-
ary or cooperative surrogate. Professor Ambos argues for a reassessment of 
the current strategy of prosecuting international core crimes and advocates 
for a more comprehensive approach. Finally, in The Wrongheaded and 
Dangerous Campaign to Criminalize Good Faith Legal Advice,25
In addition to the symposium articles contained in this volume, the 
journal is honored to publish Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim,
Associate 
Dean Julian Ku of Hofstra Law School rejects the argument of scholars and 
advocates who insist that the lawyers who authored the torture memos 
should be criminally punished for their advice. Professor Ku contends that a 
criminal prosecution of an attorney’s good-faith interpretation of the law 
will be unsuccessful under both U.S. and international law, and the prosecu-
tion will violate the attorney’s First Amendment right and broader norms of 
free expression by chilling government lawyers from providing legal advice 
on complex issues raising national security implications.
26
24 Kai Ambos, Prosecuting Guantánamo in Europe: Can and Shall the Masterminds of the 
“Torture Memos” Be Held Criminally Responsible on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction?,
42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 405 (2009).
remarks delivered by the Honorable Navanethem Pillay, U.N. High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, when she received the Frederick K. Cox Inter-
national Law Center’s 2009 Humanitarian Award for Advancing Global 
Justice at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law the week 
before our Guantánamo symposium. We were delighted that High Commis-
sioner Pillay attended our event and lectured on an important topic, the 
prosecution of sexual violence crimes perpetrated against women in interna-
tional or internal armed conflict situations. In her lecture, she discussed how 
the current normative framework fails to frame sexual violence from a vic-
tim’s perspective and, instead, focuses on the presence of consent, resulting 
in the re-traumatization of the victims who must describe the crime. She 
described cases that portray rape as a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of other wartime violations and establish command responsibility. High 
25 Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign to Criminalize Good Faith 
Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449 (2009).
26 Navanethem Pillay, Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 459 (2009).
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Commissioner Pillay concluded that drawing on other methodologieslike 
anti-trafficking protocolscan provide legal processes to strengthen the 
prosecution of sexual violence. 
The issue concludes with an addendum to the recently published 
Case Western Journal of International Law’s The International Criminal 
Court and the Crime of Aggression Issue (volume 41, nos. 2 & 3). In a 
submission which will be useful to the delegates at the ICC Review Confe-
rence in Kampala in May–June 2010, Donald Ferencz, Director of the Pla-
nethood Foundation, recounts the discussion at the Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law symposium panel in September 2008, entitled A
Roundtable Discussion About the Process by Which Aggression Is Included 
in the Statute and Its Effect on Non-Party States, on the differences between 
various amendment protocols specified within Article 121 of the Rome Sta-
tute and how the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression depends on the placement of these proposed amendment pro-
tocols within the Rome Statute.27
The articles contained in this symposium issue illustrate the wide 
range of issues arising from the Bush Administration’s War on Terror. The 
articles highlight the numerous problems and mistakes that have occurred 
and the lessons to be learned from these policies and decisions. They shine a 
light on the path the Obama Administration ought to take as it tackles the 
challenges of closing Guantánamo Bay and responding to Bush era-abuses.
We are extremely grateful to the experts who participated in the “After 
Guantánamo” symposium, the Wolf Family Foundation whose generous 
support made the conference possible, and to the student editors of this issue 
who worked diligently on the preparation of this publication.
Ferencz also provides his personal obser-
vations on how the adoption of provisions on the crime of aggression will 
bolster the rule of law and the Nuremberg principles. 
27 Donald M. Ferencz, Bringing the Crime of Aggression Within the Active Jurisdiction of 
the ICC, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 531 (2009).
